In an increasingly globalized world, pathogens travel faster than ever before. Commercial aviation connects remote villages to major metropolitan hubs in less than a day. Supply chains stretch across continents. Climate change is expanding the geographic range of disease-carrying animals and insects. Against this backdrop, the decision by the United States to withdraw from the World Health Organization (WHO) is not merely short-sighted, it is strategically misguided and frankly dangerous.
Global health security depends on cooperation, coordination, and early warning systems between nations and institutions. The WHO, despite its imperfections, remains the central nexus for these functions. Infectious diseases do not recognize borders, and no nation, however wealthy or technologically advanced, can insulate itself from global outbreaks. Two recent viruses in particular, Nipah and Marburg, underscore why disengagement from international health collaboration is risky.
The reality of globalized disease
The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated how quickly a localized outbreak can become a global crisis. Originating in Wuhan, China, in 2019, its cases within weeks had spread internationally. The economic, political, and social consequences were profound and the “shutdowns” still reverberate years later. In the aftermath of the COVID-19 experience and roughly 7 million deaths, the lesson was clear: Early detection and coordinated response are essential to prevent future catastrophes.
The WHO at that time served as a clearinghouse for epidemiological data, outbreak alerts, laboratory collaboration, and international response protocols. These functions are all the more vital now. The WHO facilitates information-sharing between countries that might otherwise lack diplomatic or technical channels. Most recently, the WHO Pandemic Agreement and Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing system, which if ratified will be a landmark program in detecting emerging threats and sharing data and resources across nations. In an interconnected world, cutting ties to this shared infrastructure would weaken not only global preparedness but also individual national security.
Nipah virus: a high-fatality threat
Nipah virus, first identified in 1998 in Malaysia, is a zoonotic pathogen transmitted from animals, specifically fruit bats, to humans. It can also spread through contaminated food and, in some outbreaks, from person to person. The virus has a mortality rate that can exceed 40 to 75 percent, depending on the outbreak and available medical care.
Outbreaks have occurred primarily in South and Southeast Asia, including Bangladesh and India. While geographically limited so far, Nipah has characteristics that concern epidemiologists: high fatality rates, potential human-to-human transmission, and no widely available vaccine or specific treatment.
In a globalized era, a Nipah outbreak in one region could spread internationally through travel before detection systems fully activate. The recent emergence of Nipah viral infections in India in late 2025 are thus highly concerning. India is the largest country in the world with massive air travel and high population density, a potential recipe for disaster not only for Indians but global citizens all over. Recently, certain South Asian countries began airport screenings, however this may not be enough.
Rapid information exchange and coordinated containment strategies are critical, especially as familiarity with Nipha is less than that with coronaviruses. The WHO plays a key role in strategic containment maneuvers, coordinating research priorities, and mobilizing international response teams.
The U.S. withdrawal from the WHO risks limiting its influence over how such threats are tracked and addressed. Moreover, the budget deficit that the lack of American funding has caused renders the WHO ineffective. Even if the United States maintains its own surveillance systems, it relies heavily on global transparency and shared data, mechanisms the WHO would ideally facilitate.
Marburg virus: a warning from filoviruses
Marburg virus, a close relative of Ebola, causes severe hemorrhagic fever with case fatality rates that can reach up to 88 percent in some outbreaks. First identified in 1967 after laboratory workers in Germany and Serbia were exposed to infected monkeys from Uganda, Marburg has since appeared in sporadic outbreaks across Africa.
Recent outbreaks in countries such as Ghana and Equatorial Guinea have highlighted the virus’s continued threat. Like Nipah, Marburg is zoonotic and can spread between humans through direct contact with bodily fluids. There is currently no widely approved vaccine or specific antiviral treatment.
While historically, outbreaks have been geographically contained, Marburg infections in central and east Africa have occurred roughly yearly: Rwanda in 2024, Tanzania in 2023, Ghana in 2022, Guinea in 2021, and more. Most recently an outbreak occurred in Ethiopia in 2025 and was concluded in early 2026, thanks to WHO intervention.
The potential for international spread of Marburg remains as it only requires one escape case to begin international transmission, akin to what was seen with the Ebola virus outbreak in 2014. Early case detection, rapid laboratory confirmation, coordinated quarantine guidance, and international funding for containment are essential to ensure that scenario does not occur. The WHO is central in declaring public health emergencies, issuing global advisories, and deploying experts to affected regions rapidly when Marburg is identified.
If the United States continues to distance itself from the WHO, it reduces its visibility into emerging outbreaks, weakening its voice in setting response standards, and undermines global solidarity at precisely the moment when coordination is most needed.
National security and soft power
Public health is national security. Infectious disease outbreaks can destabilize governments, disrupt economies, and create humanitarian crises that ripple outward. Participation in the WHO allows the United States not only to receive information but also to shape global norms, influence research priorities, and strengthen alliances.
Moreover, leadership in global health enhances American soft power. When the U.S. supports vaccine campaigns, laboratory capacity-building, and disease surveillance networks, it builds trust and diplomatic goodwill. Withdrawal cedes that influence to other global actors.
Reform vs. retreat
Critics of the WHO often point to bureaucratic inefficiencies or political pressures. These concerns are not trivial. However, disengagement is not reform. Remaining at the table provides leverage to demand transparency, improve governance, and strengthen accountability. Walking away diminishes influence without eliminating risk.
Nipah and Marburg are reminders that the next pandemic threat may already be circulating in wildlife reservoirs, waiting for the right ecological or social conditions to spill over. Preparedness requires robust international systems and that is precisely what the WHO aims to achieve. Beyond infectious diseases, the WHO is also central in responding to chronic diseases, cancer, and other maladies.
Disease control is ultimately a global public good. No country can achieve it alone. In a world defined by interdependence, retreating from multilateral health institutions weakens collective resilience. The United States has historically been a leader in global health initiatives, from eradicating smallpox to funding HIV/AIDS programs. Continued engagement with the WHO aligns with that tradition and serves pragmatic national interests.
Viruses do not carry passports. They do not respect sovereignty. As COVID-19 demonstrated and Nipah and Marburg threaten, emerging diseases demand cooperation, vigilance, and shared responsibility. In such a world, turning inward is not strength, it is vulnerability.
Adeel Khan is a hematology-oncology physician.
